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ABSTRACT
International-capital market integration has become a key
policy issue in the prospective integration of Europe of 1992.
In this context this paper provides a theoretical analysis of
the effects of relaxing restrictions on the international flow
of capital on the fiscal branch of government:the optimal
provision of public goods, the structure of taxation and
income redi.sributioa policies. Concerning issues cf
interdependent economies the paper analyzes the scope of tax
coordination. The major findings are: (a)with no
administrative barriers to capital flows the optimal policy is
to tax income from investment abroad and from investments at
home at the same time;(b) the cost of public funds falls and
the supply of public goods rises if restrictions on
international capital flows are relaxed:(c) the amount of
income redistrjbutjons increases with the international-
capital market liberalization; (d) some minimal degree of tax
coordination(such as origin-based or source-based tax
schemes) is essential for the existence of an equilibrium in
an integrated world economy.
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ISRAEL ISRAELI. Introduction
International capital market integration has become the subject of
a majortheoreticalandpracticalInterest in recent times.
Policymakers are becoming more and more aware of the potential benefits
accruing from such integration, which allows more efficient allocations
of investment between the domestic and the foreign market. In
particular, with the prospective comprehensive integration of capital
markets in Europe in 1992, some key policy issues arise.'
The financial, monetary and exchange rate managementpolicy
implications of capital market integration have been widely discussed in
the context of the European Monetary System (EMS); see, for instance,
the survey by Micossi (1988). However, capital market integration has
also profound effects on the fiscal branch of each country separately
and on the scope of tax coordination among them. These issues have not
been dealt with extensively so far.The present paper attempts to
contribute to the economic analysis in this area.2
The opening up of an economy to international capital movements
affects, as expected, the size and the structure of the fiscal branch of
its government.Capital flows influence both the optimal structure of
taxes, on domestic and foreign-source income, and the welfare cost of
taxation. As a result, the optimal size of government (the optimal
provision of public goods) and the magnitude of its redistribution
(transfer) policies are affected as well. In this context the paper
analyzes the effects of relaxing restrictions on the international flow
of capital on the fiscal branch of government.
The optimal size of government, or more precisely the optimal









In calculating the cost of public funds, one must take into account
the optimal response of the structure of taxation (on incomes from all
sources) to the liberalization policy because the cost of public funds
is derived from a process of a tax optimization. Therefore, we also
analyze the effect of liberalization on the structure of taxation. Of
course, entangled with the structure of taxation is also the issue of
the optimal size of income redistribution.For this reason we also
analyze in section VI the effect of international capital market
liberalization on the optimal redistribution (transfer) policy of the
government.
Finally, integration of capital markets brings up the issue of
international tax coordination. It turns out that perfect mobility of
capital necessitates some minimal degree of coordination among the tax
authorities. This is discussed in section VII.
We present in section II the analytical framework that serves for
our analysis. Sections III and IV discuss alternative regimes of
analysis. Such analysi rnplies that the marginal cost of
must be equated to the marginal utility from public goods.
in order to find the effect of liberalization in the
capital markets on the optimal quantity of public goods we
effect of such a liberalization on the cost of public
is done in section V in which we also distinguish between
variable internal terms oftradeassociated with.3-
international capital mobility. Concluding remarks are included in the
final section.
II. The Analytical Framework
Consider a stylized two-period model of a small open economy with
one composite good, serving both for (private and public) consumption
and for investment. In the first period the economy possesses an
initial endowment of the composite good.Individuals can decide how
much of their initial endowments to consume in the first period and how
much to save. Saving is allocated to either domestic investment or
foreign investment. In the second period, output (produced by capital
and labor) and income from foreign investment are allocated between
private and public consumption. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that the government is active only in the second period. The government
employs taxes on labor, taxes on income from domestic investment, and
taxes on income from investment abroad in order to finance optimally
(taking into account both efficiency and equity considerations) both its
(public) consumption and a (uniform lump-sum) subsidy for redistribution
purposes.
For simplicity, while still capturing real-world basic features, we
assume that government spending on public goods does not affect
individual demand patterns for private goods or the supply of labor.
That is, only the taxes that are needed to finance these expenditures
affect individual demands and supplies, but not the expenditures-4-
themselves. Formally, this feature is obtained by assuming that the
utility function is weakly separable between private goods and services,
on the one hand, and public goods and services, on the other. Thatis,
individual h's utility is:
(1) uh(clh, C2h, Lh, C) —uh(clh,C2h, L.a) +mh(G),
where uh and are the private and public components of the utility
function, respectively; Clh, C2h
and L. are first-period
consumption, second-period consumption and (second-period) labor supply,
respectively; and C is (second-period) public consumption.3
Denote saving in the form of domestic capital by K. and saving in
the form of foreign capital by Bh. The aggregate saving in the form of
domestic capital is equal to the the stock of capital in the second
period, since we assume for concreteness, without affecting the results
of the paper, that the patterns of capital flows are such that the
country is a capital exporter (i.e.￿0). Hence, the budget




t -taxon capital income from domestic sources;
-taxon capital income from foreign sources;
8- taxon labor income;
S' -lump-sunisubsidy;
r -domesticrate of interest;
-foreignrate of interest (net of taxes levied abroad);
w -wagerate;
-initial(first-period) endowment.
Obviously, in the absence of (quantity) restrictions on capital
flows, individuals must earn the same net return on both forms of
*
investments, that is r(l-t) —r(l-t'). With restrictions on capital
flows the latter equality does not have to hold. In such a case there
is an infra-marginal profit on foreign investment, resulting from the
net interest differential. (This differential is equal to the capital
export tax rate which is equivalent to the quota on capital exports.)
One possibility is for this profit to accrue to the individual
investors. Another possibilty is for the government to fully tax away
this profit. (This is the equivalent capital-export tax version of the
capital-export quota.) We adopt the second possibility, namely that the
government chooses the level of the tax on income from foreign
investments (t') so as to eliminate any infra-marginal profits. This
.Lnpliesthatwhether or not there are restrictions on foreign
Investment, the government chooses t' so as to maintain the equality-6-
r(l-t) —r*(lt) That is, the rate of tax on income from foreign
4




Under this tax scheme, the individual is indifferent between
investing at home or abroad (Bh) caring only about the level of
total investment '<-h +Bh).
Thus, at equilibrium, the size of the
aggregate domestic capital is determined by the demand for capital by
domestic firms.The latter is determined by the standard equalization
of the marginal product of capital to the domestic rate of interest, r.





is the consumer (after-tax) price of second-period consumption,
(6) —(l-O)w[l+(l-t)r]-7-
is the consumer price of labor and S —q2S'is the present value of
the subsidy. Maximization of the utility function h subject to the
budget constraint (4), yields the consumption demand functions
(7) Cjh —C1(q2q 1h +S) ,i—1,2,
the labor supply function
(8) Lh —L(q2, th+S),
and the utility obtained from these demand and supply functions, namely,
the indirect utility function:
(9) h —
vh(q2,q1h +S).
Domestic output(Y) is produced In the second period by capital
and labor, according to a constant-returns-to-scale production function
(10) Y —F(K,L),
where K — isthe stock of domestic capital and L —EhLhis the
aggregate supply of labor.







where I —EIisaggregate first-period endowment, B —E.Bh
is
aggregate investment abroad, C1 —EClh
is aggregate consumption in the
first period and C2 —EhC2his aggregate consumption in the second
period.
Substituting (2), (7), (8),(10) and the first-period resource
constraint (ha) into the second-period resource constraint (lib) yields
the equilibrium condition:








Observe that aggregate consuxnptions, C1 and C2, depend not only on
aggregate income, but also on its distribution.
III. International Capital Flows: Alternative Regimes
We consider two alternative regimes. In the first regime the
government sets quantity restrictions on capital exports. In I2
regime,there are no restrictions on capital exports and 3I ius
determined by market clearance.-9-
The optimal tax/transfer policy and provision of public goods are
obtained as a solution to the program of maximizing the indirect social
welfare function
(13) W(q2, q I + S.... "H + S) — +
subject to the resource constraint (12). In this setup, common in the
public finance literature, the government does not directly operate on
private sector quantities, but rather on prices (through taxes) which
affect these quantities. The government tax policy focuses on
q2,
and S as the control variables. In the first regime we treat B as a
parameter. In the second regime, Bis also a control endogenous
variable.Notice, however, that this does not mean that the government
directly determines the level of investment abroad; rather, the
government, through its tax policy, affects total savings (K+B) and
domestic investment (K) and B is determined as a residual (the
difference between total savings and domestic investment).
Notice that, by Walras Law, the government budget constraint is
satisfied. Also, the wage rate (w) and the domestic rate of interest (r)
are determined by the standard marginal productivity conditions: F1 —r
andF2 —w.Given q2 and we can solve for the tax rates, t
and 9, by using (5) and (6).-10-
IV. Efficient Capital Flows
Since there are distortionary. taxes as part of the optimal program,
obviously the resource allocation is not Pareto-efficient: the
intertemporal allocation of consumption, the leisure-consumption choice,
and theprivate-public consumption tradeoffs are all distorted.
Nevertheless, the fully optimal program (namely, the second regime where
no restrictions on B exist) requires an efficient allocation of
capital between investment at home and abroad, so that F1 —r*.That
is, the marginal product of domestic capital must be equated to the
foreign rate of return on capital (net of foreign taxes).
To see this, observe that the endogenous variable B does not
appear in the objective function (13), so that thefirst-order
conditions foroptimality require that the derivative of the resource
constraint (12) with resPect to B, i.e. -
F1+(l4r*)l,be equal to
zero. Hence, F1 —r.Evidently,this is an open economy variant of
the aggregate efficiency theorem in optimal tax theory (see Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971), Sadka (1977), and Dixit (1985)).
Notice also that this production-efficiency result implies also
that there should be no differential tax treatment of foreign and
domestic sources of income, namely:
t—t'.-11-
However, in the presence of restrictions on capital exports the
production efficiency result does not necessarily hold: the return to
capital at home may be lower than the net (after foreign taxes only)
return on investment abroad.
We turn next to the study of the effects of relaxing the
restrictions on investments abroad.
V.The Cost of Public Funds in an Open Economy
In the presence of distortionary taxes, the social cost of an
additional dollar raised by taxes (namely the marginal cost of public
funds) may exceed one dollar, due to the existence of excess-burden
(deadweight loss) of taxation. The optimal provision of public goods is
determined by equating their marginal benefit with the marginal cost of
public funds. In this section we directly examine the effect of
relaxing the restrictions on B on the optimal level of C.Since we
have assumed that the marginal benefit fromC is diminishing (a
concave m), it follows that the optimal G increases if and only if
the marginal cost of public funds declines. Thus, we indirectly analyze
the effect of a liberalization of the international capital markets on
the marginal cost of public funds.
For this purpose, we treat Bas a parameter and examine the
effect of changing B on the optimal quantity of the public good.
Specifically, the optimal level of the public good is a function ofB,
denoted by G(B). We then look for the sign of dG/dB in the region-12-
where F1 —r<r,so that increasing B enhances production
efficiency and, thus, social welfare.
We proceed as follows. For given levels of C and B, let us
maximize the private component of W in (13),(namely, E.-yhvh(q2,
+S))subject to the resource constraint (12). Denote the value of





The first-order condition is
(15) N2 +M'—0
and the second-order condition is
(16) N22 +M"￿0.






By (16), the denominator in (17) is positive. Hence,
dG
(18) Sign() —Sign(N12).
To proceed further, at this point, we first abstractfrom
redistribution considerations.
1. Efficiency Considerations
Suppose that all individuals are alike so that we may consider a
single representative individual and drop the index h. (Alternatively,
we may assume that redistribution can be done via nondistortionary
means.) Alleviating the constraint on foreign lending affects the
optimal size of government through two channels. First, increasing B
generates an additional source of revenues for the government, thereby
allowing lower taxes on existing sources. This tends to lower the
marginal cost of public funds (and raise the size of government).
Second, increasing B may adversely affect the internal terms of trade
(associated withnontradablefactorsor goods) for government
expenditures. This effect can raise the marginal cost of public funds
(and lower the size of government). To highlight these two effects we
consider first in the next subsection the pure income effect.
a. Constant internal terms of trade
Assume a linear production function, yielding constant real factor
prices: (￿ r*) and forcapital and labor, respectively. In-14-
this case we can unambiguously show that N12 >0 and consequently,
that dG/dB >0.











Hence, by the envelope theorem, we obtain
(20) N2(B,C) —-)(B,G)￿0,




Similarly, equation (19) (using the envelope theorem) yields




Onecan show (see Appendix A) that N(.,.) is concave. Hence, N11
<0,and it follows from (23) that <0.Thus,(21) implies that
N21 >0. Therefore, dG/dB >0. That is, the relaxation of
international capital controls, in the absence of adjustment in the
internal terms of trade, lowers the marginal cost of public funds and
increases the optimal size of government.
b. Variable internal terms of trade
To analyze the effect of variable internal terms of trade on
government's expenditures in a simple manner, we assume that labor, the
nontradable factor of production, exhibitsdiminishingmarginal
productivity and that government's expenditures are used entirely to
hire labor. Specifically, we continue to assume constant internal
intertemporal terms of trade, that is, r is constant (at the level
r). However, in the second period consumption can be provided in that
period (in addition to being transferred from the first period) by a
concave production function, f(L), using labor alone. The rent (pure
profit) generated by such a technology is assumed to be fully taxed by
the government. The government hires LG units of labor in the second
period at the prevailing wage,w —f';the government does not
purchase any quantity of the consumption good. We thus replace G by
Lc.-16-
In this case, the function N(B, LG) is defined by:













Following the same procedure as in the preceding subsection, we
conclude that
(21a) N21(B, Lc) —- 1(B,LG)w
dw
..)
Thefirst term in the expression for N21 is similar to (21).As
before, it is straightforward to show that <0,so that this term
contributes toward making N21 positive, i.e., to increase the size of
government in response to alleviating controls on foreign lending (see
equation (17)). However, the second term will usually work in the
opposite direction:the pure income effect of raising B tends to
increase the consuintion of leisure, thereby increasing the cost of labor
that the government hires. Thus, the optimal LG (namely, the real
magnitude of government's consumption) may at the end decline in
response to a liberalization of the international capital market.-17-
2. Redistribution Considerations
Now, let us return to the framework of sub-section (la) and
reintroduce the redistribution motive.
To simplify the exposition, suppose that the economy consists of
two individuals (or two classes of individuals), denoted by indicesA
and B. We further simplify the analysis by assuming a fixed labor
supply (and dropping it altogether from the model). Thus, we are left
onlywithintertemporaldecisions and tax-induced intertemporal
distortions. Still, to proceed further, we employ a log-linear utility
function, in order to keep the analysis tractable.
To emphasize the equity issues, we consider the extreme case of a
max-mm social welfare criterion, that is, we assume for the social
welfare function in (13) that —0and —1(where 'A <
Thefunction N, the maximized value of the private component in the
social welfare function W, is defined in this case by:









where the log-linear individual utility function is given by-18-
(25) u(C1, C2)— alog C1 + (l-a)log C2.
Employing the constraint to eliminate S, we can reduce (24) to:
(26) N(B,G) —Max(log[2I(l+r)+ t(1a)(IB -
+(r-r)B-C]
-log[l+ r(l -(l-a)t)]
+ (1-a)log[l+r(1-t)J + constant)
—MaxH(t,B,C).
t
The first-order condition for t is
(27) H1(t, B, G) —0,
while the second-order condition is
(28) H11(t, B, C) ￿ 0.
By the envelope theorem:
N1(B,C) —H2(t,B, C)
and hence:-19-
(29) N12 —H21 + H23.








Since H11< 0 (by 28), it follows that
(32) Sign(N12) —Sign(H12H13 -H23H11).
Using the definition of H (namely, equation (26)) to find the
partial derivatives we substitute these derivatives into (32).
This substitution yields




Since 0 <1-a<1,it follows that (33) is positive and hence
dG/dB >VI. TaxStructureand Redistribution in an Open Economy
In this section we examine the effects of relaxing some of the
controls on international capital flows on the structure of taxation and
the size of redistribution. We continue to adopt the simplified
framework of subsection V.2. Assume further that public component in
the utility function mG is equal to Slog C. In this case, the
optimal policy is the solution to the following problem:
(34) Max (H(t, B, C) + SlogG},
(t,G)
where H(.) is defined in (26).
As before, Bis a parameter and we consider the relationships
between this parameter and the optimal values of t and C (denoted by
t(B) and C(B), respectively). In doing so, we find also the effect of
changing B on t' and S, as will be shown later.
Thefirst-orderconditions are:
(35) H1(t, B, C) —0,
(36) H3(t, B, C) + —0.
Total differentiation of (35)-(36) with respect to B yields:-21-
(37) —
(-H12H33+ H13H23 + H126/G2),
where A is positive by the second-order conditions for the solution to
(34)6 In Appendix B we show that
(38) -H12 H33 + H13 H23 —0
and
(39) H12 < 0.
Hence, dt/dB < 0.
Thus, relaxing the controls on investments abroad reduces the
optimal rate of tax on income from domestic investment.This is a
natural result in view of the fact that relaxing the controls improves
* -*
welfare. Since t' —[r
-(1-t)rl/r,itfollows that t' should
be lowered too. That is, the optimal response to relaxing the
restrictions on investments abroad is to lower the tax on income from
such investments.
To find dS/dB, recall that the constraint in (24) was employed in
order to solve for S in terms of t, B and C:
*-
rt(l-Q)(IA+IB) + (r -r)B -C
(40) S—
2(l+r[l-(l-cx)t])-22-
We have already concluded that an increase in B raises G and
lowers t.Thesechanges have conflicting effects on S, as can be seen
from (40). We employed numerical calculations to demonstrate the effect
of raising B on the optimal S. These calculations suggest that
raising B increases the size of the deinogrant S. Again, this result
is natural in view of the fact that relaxing the restrictions on
international capital flows improves the efficiency of total investment,
thereby enabling the economy to devote more resources for redistribution
of income.
The results of the numerical calculations are given in Table 1.
TABLE 1: The Effect of Capital Controls on the
Optimal Supply of the Public Good (C), on the Tax




a —0.6,6 —0.05,i— 0.50,r* —0.75,'A —1.0,'B —3.0,W —11A—
alog C + (1-a) log C +Slog C.
* Note that physical investment and foreign lending are the only forms
of transferring resources from the present to the future. Hence, t
and t' may well exceed one, as long as 1 +(1-t)iand 1 +(ltD)r*








VII. Capital Mobility and International Tax Coordination
Capital market integration between two large countries brings out
the issue of tax coordination between them.When residents of one
countryinvest in the other country, one must reckon with the
possibility of tax arbitrage that may undermine the feasibility of
integration. It is quite obvious that some coordination between
countries may in general improve the welfare of both countries. In the
case of tax coordination, however, we show that coordination is
essential for a sensible world equilibrium (with nonzero interest rates)
to at all exit.
To highlight this issue, consider a two-country world with perfect
capital mobility. Denote the interest rates in the home country and the
*
foreigncountry byr and r ,respectively.In principle, the home
country may have three different tax rates applying to interest income:
(1) t -thetax rate levied on domestic residents on their
domestic-source income;
the tax rate levied on domestic resident on their foreign-
source income
the tax rate levied on non-residents on their interest
income in the home country.
country may correspondingly have three tax rates which we
and tNRD. Furthermore, let us assume that these
symmetrically for both interest earned and interest paid
deductibility of interest expenses, including tax rebates).-24-
A complete integration of the capital markets between the two
countries (including the possibility of borrowing in one country in
order to invest in the other country) requires, due to arbitrage
possiblities, the fulfillment of the following conditions:





The first condition applies to the residents of the home country and it
requires that they be indifferent between investing at home or abroad.
Otherwise, they can borrow an infinite amount in the low (net of tax)
interest rate country in order to invest an infinite amount in the high
(net of tax) interest rate country. The second condition similarly
applies to the residents of the foreign country.
Notice that unless







the only solution to the linear system of equations (41)-(42) is a zero
rate of interest in each country:
*r—r—0.-25-
Thus, some international tax coordination is needed in order to satisfy
(43)and yield a sensible world equilibrium.
Somewhatsurprisingly, the two most common polar schemes of
source-based or origin-based taxation are examples of workable tax
coordinations (although, by no means globally efficient arrangements)
even when the two countries do not adopt the same scheme. Consider
first the case in which both countries adopt the source-based tax
scheme.In this case income is taxed according to its source,







sothat (43) is satisfied and we can have a world equilibrium with
positive rates of interest.
Similarly, considthe case where both countries adopt the
origin-based tax scheme: income is taxed according to the origin of the






sothat, again, (43) is satisfied.
Next, consider the case in which one country adopts one tax scheme
while the other adopts another one. Suppose, for instance, that the
home country adopts the origin-based tax scheme, while the foreign-26-










and, again, (43) is satisfied.
However, if the two countries do not stick to one or the other of
the two polar schemes, then (43) need not hold in and no sensible world
equilibrium exists. Suppose, for instance, that each country levies the
same tax rate on its residents (irrespective of the source of their








Hence, unless (l-t) (1-tw)
—1, which is just a sheer
coincidence, condition (43) is violated.
Thus, some tax coordination is essential for a full capital market
integration. Any mutually beneficial tax coordination must satisfy the
tax arbitrage condition (43).-27-
VIII. Conclusion
Weanalyzedin this paper the policy implications of the
integration of the international capital markets. Special attention was
paid to the effects on the marginal cost of public funds, a crucial
factor in the determination of the optimal size of government and the
magnitude of income redistribution. Inherent in the determination of
the cost of public funds is the design of the structure of taxation (on
labor income, domestic-source capital income and foreign-source capital
income).
In the context of a world economy with integrated capital markets,
there arises the issue of international tax coordination. This issue
has two aspects.First, the elementary problem of what international
tax arrangements are at all viable in the wake of capital market
arbitrage possiblities. This issue was dealt with in this paper. A
second, yet to be investigated, aspect is the determination of mutually
beneficial international tax arrangements from the set of viable
arrangements.-28-
APPENDIX A
In this appendix we prove that N(B, C) is concave.Recall that
N(B, C) is defined by (19). Since there is only one individual and a
lump-sum tax/subsidy is allowed, it follows that the government can
choose any bundle (C1, C2, L) which is feasible (i.e., which satisfies
the resource constraint in (19)). Thus, N may be equivalently defined
by









We have to show that
N(aB' +(1-a)B",aG' +(1-a)G")
aN(B', C') +(l-a)N(B",C")
for all (B', C'), (B", C") and 0 a ￿ 1.
Suppose the bundle. (C1, C, L) is a solution to (Al) for (B,C) —
(B',G') and the bundle (CI.. C;1 L) is a solution to (Al) for (B, C)
—(B",C"), namely: N(B ,C)— u(C1,C2, L )andN(B G )— u(C1,
L).
By being solutions to optimum problems, the bundles (C1, C2, L)
and (C;i C, L) satisfy the constraint in (Al), namely:-29-
—
V — V *
' I I




— — "*" "
(A3) r(I-C1-B )+wL" + I-C1 + r B -
C2
-C￿ 0.
Hence, upon multiplying (A2)by the factor a and (A3) by the
factor (1-a) and adding them together, it follows that:
(A4) i(I -[aC1
+ (l-a)C1] -jaB+ (l-a)B])
+ w[aL+ (l-a)L] + I -[aC1+ (l-a)c1)
+ r jaB + (l-a)B ]- [aC2+ (l-a)C21
-jaG + (l-a)G ]0.
Thus, the bundle (aC1 +(l-a)C1, + (1-a)C, aL + (l-a)L)
is feasible for (B, C) —(aB+ (l-a)B ,aG+ (l-a)G ).Therefore:
(A5) N(aB + (l-a)B, aG + (l-a)G) ￿
u(aC1 + (l-a)C1, aC; + (l-a)C2, aL + (l-a)L)
￿ au(C,C, L') + (la)u(c;, ;,L)
—aN(B ,C)+(l-a)N(B ,C),
wherethe first inequality in (AS) follows from the definition of
N(,•) as the value of the maximand in (Al). and the second inequality
follows from the concavity of u. This completes the proof of the
concavity of N.-30-
APPENDIXB
Inthis appendix we verify the expressions of (33) and (38)-(3t').
The function H (see (26)) is given by:
















(B4) H3 —- 2
r -r























(310) 1133 —* - - (rr)(la)r(IBIB)
Hence,
1112H13 -H11H33 —
1 (1-a) *- -2 — - 2 - 2)(r•r)r (1-cr)
[1+r(1-t)] [1+r(1-(1-a)t)J
(2IA(1+) +t(1a)(IBIA)+(r*)B-C]2
This completes the proof of(33).
Next, we prove (38) and (39).
Employing (36), (87), (B9) and (BlO) we find that-32-
2 2
-(H12) (H12)
12 H33 +H1323 —* +* — 0
(r (r r)(1a)(IBIA)
which proves (38). From (B6), we observe that H12 <0,which proves
(39).-33-
FOOTNOTES
In a recent paper Micossi (1988) provides a succint survey of the
proposed institutional arrangements forthe1992Europoean
integration. He writes:
"The European integration entails the elimination of restrictions
and discriminatory regulationsandadministrativepractices
concerning: (i) the right of establishment and acquisition of
participations by foreign institutions in domesticfinancial
markets; (ii) permitted operations of foreign-controlled
financial institutions; (iii) cross-bordertransactions in
financial services. The first two items basically involve the
freedom to supply services in EC national markets, the third, the
freedom to move capital throughout the Community."
2
Foran earlier discussion of the interaction among taxes,
government consumption, and international capital flow, see Razin
and Svensson (1983).
To ensure diminishing marginal rates of substitution between
private and public commodities we assume, as usual, that uh and
mh are strictly concave.
An equivalent policy to taxing away the infra-marginal profits
(resulting from the net interest differential) is to auction off
the quotas on investment abroad.
The reader who is familiar with the optimal income tax literature
may realize that the issue of the sign of dã/dB is related to the
issue of the concavity of the maximized (reduced-form) social
welfare function with respect to tax revenues; see Balcer and
Sadka (1982) and Stiglitz (1982).
6 The derivative dÔ/dB is negative as shown in section V.2.-34-
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